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The trustee in bankruptcy of a person who has been robbed, can prove in thu
offender's bankruptcy for the amount stolen, though the offender has not been prosecuted. The trustee represents, not the injured person, but his creditors,- and the
necessity of prosecuting the offender before a civil claim can be maintained in respect
of the wrong, is a personal duty, which does not extend to-the injured person's
trustee in bankruptcy. The trustee will be allowed to prove, notwithstanding that
the injured person has himself, without having prosecuted, tendered a proof in the
offender's bankruptcy.
Whether a voluntary assignee of the debt would be relieved from the duty to
prosecute, qumre.

from a decision of BACON, C. J., in bankruptcy.
Shepherd, a clerk to Willis & Co., bankers, absconded on March
16th 1877, and on the 24th of March the bankers received a letter
from him confessing that he had robbed them of 78521. 19s. On
the 26th the bankers gave instructions, in pursuance of which a warrant for Shepherd's apprehension was, on the 28th, put into the
hands of a detective, who searched for but was unable to find him.
On the 4th of May Shepherd was adjudicated bankrupt, and the
bank tendered a proof against his estate for the amount embezzled
by him.
The bank having subsequently gone into liquidation, William
Turquand, the trustee, applied that the bank's proof against Shepherd's estate should be admitted. This was refused by the register
of the Greenwich county court, on the ground that Willis & Co. had
not done their best to bring Shepherd to justice, but on an appeal
to BACON, Chief Judge in Bankruptcy, he reversed the register's
decision and allowed the proof. Thereupon the trustee in Shepherd's bankruptcy appealed to this court.
APPEAL

De Gex, Q. C., and H. F. Dickens, for the appellant.-The bankrupt's offence was a felony, 24 & 25 Vict., c. 96, s. 68, and there
can be no claim for a debt created by a felonious act until the creditor has prosecuted the debtor. The authorities for our contention
are Ex parte Elliott, 3 Mont. & A. 110; Stone v. Mfarsh (Fauntleroy's Case), 6 B. & C. 551, and Marsh v. Keating, 1 Bing. N.
C. 198. The law is clearly stated in 'Robson on Bankruptcy, 3d
ed., pp. 205-6. Wells v. Abrahams, L. R. 7 Q. B. 554, is not
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against this. [JAmEs, L. J.-Can a man plead his own felony,
and if not, is his trustee in bankruptcy in any better position ?]
The trustee can take the objection: Ex parte Elliott. The plea is
not really taking advantage of his own crime; it would aid conviction. Lutterell v. .Reynell, 1 Mod. 282, is the only case where
it has been held that a felon cannot plead his felony. Before Stone
v. Marsh many judges thought that the right of action was abso
lutely merged, but there it was decided that the right is only sus
pended until after prosecution. The former cases were Markham
v. Cobb, Noy 82, Sir W. Jo. 147; Lutterell v. Beynell; -Dawkes
v. Coveneigh, Styles 346; Hiqgins v. Butcher, Yelv. 89; Coope?
v. TVitham, 1 Lev. 247. There are, of course, exceptions to the
rule, when prosecution has become impossible, e. g., by the death
of the felon, or where he has been prosecuted for a similar offence
by another person: Stone v. Marsh; Crosby v. Leng, 12 East 409;
Wickham v. Gatrill, 2 Sm. & Giff. 353; Ex parte Jones, 2 Mont.
& A. 93; Jarsh v. Keating; White v. Spettigue, 13 M. &W. 603.
[JABfEs, L. J.-If a plaintiff makes out his case without proving
any illegality he is entitled to recover, and the defendant cannot
upset him subsequently by proving that there was illegality: In re
South Wales Atlantic Steamship Co., L. R. 2 Ch. D. 763.]
Winslow, Q. C., and Bush Cooper, for the respondent, were not
called upon.
Cur. adv. vult.
BRAMWELL, L. J.-In this case the debt which is sought to be
proved arose from the felonious act of the bankrupt in embezzling
the moneys of his employers. The question is, whether, that being
so and no more having been done than has been done towards prosecuting the bankrupt, the trustee of Messrs. Willis & Co., the employers, can prove. The law on this subject is in a remarkable
state. For three hundred years it has been said in various ways by
judges, many of the greatest eminence, that without a doubt, except
in one instance, there is some impediment to the maintenance of
an action for a debt arising in this way. The doubt is that not so
much expressed by Mr. Justice BLACKBURN in Wells v. Abrahams,
as to be inferred from what he said. But, though such opinion has
been entertained and expressed for all this time, there are but two
cases in which it has operated to prevent the debt being enforced.
These two cases are Wellock v. Constantine,2 H; & C. 146, and Ex
parte.Elliott. Wellock v. Constantinehas been said to beno authority.
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If I may speak of myselt; I have no doubt I concurred in the judgment, or the statement that I had would have been set right, but I am
sure I must have done so in the faintest way, not only from what I
think now, but from what I am reported to have said then, and from
there being no reasons given for the judgment, which I should have
desired to give if I had thought there were any good ones to support
it. But at all events, there are the opinions of Chief Baron POLLOCK and Mr. Justice WILLES-opinions which no one who knew
those judges will undervalue. Then there is the judgment of Er
parte Elliott, besides the expressed opinion for centuries that a felonious origin of a debt is in some way an impediment to its enforcement. But in what way? I can think of only four possible: 1. That
no cause of action arises at all out of a felony. 2. That it does not
arise till prosecution. 3. That it arises on the act, but is suspended
till prosecution. 4. That there is neither defence to, nor suspension of the claim by or at the instance of the felon debtor, but that
the court of its own motion, or on the suggestion of the Crown,
should stay proceedings till public justice is satisfied. It must be
admitted that there are great difficulties in the way of each of these.
That the first is not true is shown by Keatirg v. Marsh, where it
was held that, prosecution being impossible, a felony gave rise to a
recoverable debt. It is difficult to believe that the second supposed
solution of the problem is correct. That would be to make the
cause of action the act of a felon plus a prosecution. The cause of
action would not arise till after both. Till then the Statute of
Limitation would not run. In such a case as the present, or where
the felon had died, it would be impossible. And it is to be observed that it is never suggested that the cause of action is the debt
and the prosecution. The third possible way is attended by difficulties. The suspension of a cause of action is a thing nearly unknown to the law. It exists where a negotiable instrument is given
for a debt, and in cases of composition with creditors, and these
were not held till after much doubt and contest. There may be
other instances. And what is to happen? Is the Statute of Limitations to run ? Suppose the debtor or his representative sue the
creditor, is his set-off suspended? Then how is the defence of impediment to be set up ? By plea ? That would be contrary to the
rule that allegans suam turpitudinem non e8t andiendus. Besides,
it would be absurd to suppose that the debtor himself ever would so
plead and face the consequences. Then, is the fourth solution
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right? Nobody ever heard of such a thing; nobody in any case
or book ever suggested it till Mr. Justice BLACKBURN did as a possibility. It is left to the court to find it out on the pleadings. If
it appears on the trial, is the judge to discharge the jury ? How is
the Crown to know it?
There are difficulties, then, in all the possible ways in which one
can suppose this impediment to be set up to the prosecution of an
action. But again, suppose it can be, what is the result ? It has
been held that where the felon is executed for another felony the
claim may be maintained. What is to happen where he dies a
natural death, where he goes beyond the jurisdiction, where there
is a piosecution and an acquittal from collusion or carelessness by
some prosecutor other than the party injured ? All these cases
create great difficulties in my mind in the application of this alleged
law, and go a long way to justify Mr. Justice BLACKBURN'S doubt.
Still, after the continued expression of opinion in the cases of Ex
parte Elliott and Wellock v. Constantine, I should hesitate to say
that there is no practical law as alleged by the respondent. It is
not necessary for us to do so in this case, because, assuming that
there is, and assuming that Messrs. Willis & Co. themselves could
maintain no claim in this case until they had performed their duty
(if it can be said there is any), to prosecute, we are of opinion that
there is no such duty in the respondent, who represents not them
but their creditors; that the debt is due at and from the time of
the act causing it; that the disability to sue or liability to have
proceedings stayed, if any, is personal to him in whom is the duty,
and consequently that this claim may be maintained. Whether
that would be so if the assignment of the debt was purely voluntary
and not under the Bankruptcy Act I do not say. I may further
add that I doubt much if Messrs. Willis & Co. themselves would
not be entitled to prove, otherwise the estate of the bankrupt might
be distributed and injustice done. If it should be said in answer
to this that a claim could be entered, the claimant must be admitted
to be heard, even before he can make a claim, and his claim would
not prevent the distribution of the assets as they are got in among
the creditors who have actually proved, unless some were set aside
especially to provide for it, which would be a strange anomaly if
the principle be a true one. In Ex parte Elliott, neither proof
nor claim was admitted.
JAMES,

L. J.-The judgment which Lord Justice BRAMWELL
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has just read, expresses my opinion as well as his, though it does
not express entirely that of Lord Justice BAGGALLAY, whose judgment I will now read:
BAGGALLAY, L. J.-I
agree with my colleagues in thinking that
the appeal in this case should be dismissed, but I prefer to rest my
decision upon the same grounds as those assigned by the Chief
Judge. It appears to me that the following propositions are affirmed
by the authorities, many of which, however, are dicta or enunciations of principle rather than decisions: 1. That a felonious act
may give rise to a maintainable action. 2. That the cause of action
arises upon the commission of the offence. 3. That, notwithstanding the existence of the cause of action, the policy of the law will
not allow the person injured to seek civil redress if he has failed in
his duty of bringing the felon to justice. 4. That this rule has no
application to c~ises in which the offender has been brought to justice at the instance of some other person inured by a similar offence,
as in Fauntleroy's Ua8e, or in which prosecution is impossible by
reason of the death of the offender, or of his escape from the jurisdiction before a prosecution could have been commenced by the
exercise of reasonable diligence. 5. That the remedy by proof in
bankruptcy is subject to the same principles of public policy as
those which affect the seeking of civil redress by action. It is unnecessary to refer to the authorities by which these propositions
have been affirmed; the whole subject is fully discussed, and the
leading decisions commented upon in the cases of Ex parte Elliott,
Wellock v. Oonstantine and Wells v. Abratams. I think, also,
that the executors or administrators of the person injured by the
felony, or his trustee in bankruptcy, can be in no better position
than he himself was in at the date of his death or of the commencement of his bankruptcy; and if at such period prosecution of the
offender had, by want of due diligence on his part, become impossible, and he had thereby been debarred from seeking civil redress,
his estate must bear the consequences. The question then remains
whether prosecution in the present case had been rendered impossible by reason of any want of due diligence on the part of Messrs.
Willis & Co., and upon this point I agree with the Chief Judge in
thinking that there was no default on their part sufficient to have
deprived them of a right to prove, had they continued solvent.
Appeal dismissed, with costs.
A principle or doctrine of law that
forbids a person feloniously, assaulted

from maintaining a civil action for redress until the offender has been prow
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cuted criminally, but allows it in case of
a trivial assault and battery; that perrmts one to recover damages for the
maliciously burning of his wood-lot, but
not for the arson of his dwelling-house,
challenges our inquiry as to its grounds
and reasons.
The reasons often assigned are, partly
because all a felon's property was formerly forfeited to the crown, and so no
advantage could result to a private party
by a suit, since his remedy would be
worthless; partly because the great majority of criminals are so poor that no
damages could ever be collected of them;
partly because the courts have power to
order a restitution of stolen property
upon conviction of the thief; partly because, as the phrase runs, the private
wrong is "merged" in the felony ; partly
because if the party injured was allowed
to recover full redress, the crime might
not be so promptly or effectively prosecuted. See Stephens's Gen. View of
Cr0m. Law, p. 107-8. But the first
reason could hardly have had much force,
since, after conviction of the felon, the
party injured was always allowed to
maintain his private action, and when of
course, the possibility of finding any estate from which to realize his damages,
would be much less than before conviction, since no forfeiture could actually
take place until conviction had : Markham v. Cobb, Noy 82 ; Dawkes v. Coveneigh, Style 346 ; Peer v. Humphrey, 2
Ad. & El. 495.
And this result shows how little reason
there is in the term "merged in the
felony," whatever meaning that might
have; and Stephens himself calls it "an
unmeaning phrase." The principle of
restitution upon a criminal conviction
would have some force and effect in prosecution for larceny, where the thief still
had the goods, as it would make a civil
action comparatively unnecessary; but
it would not at all apply to a large class
of cases. What "restitution" could be
made to a woman feloniously assaulted,
rven on conviction of the felon in the

criminal trial? And yet, in a recent
case, the woman was deprived of her
civil remedy because no one had prosecuted the felon criminally: Wellock v.
Constantine, 2 H. & 0. 146 (1863).
The other assigned reason, that courts
could not first entertain a civil action, on
motives of public policy, until after a
public prosecution, is more plausible, especially as in England, there being no
public prosecutor, as with us, each prosecution depends upon the zeal, energy
and resources of private parties. As a
stimulus therefore to push an indictment
it might be thought proper to suspend tVe
civil remedy until that duty had been discharged. See Crosby v. Leng, 12 East
.409 ; Stone v. Marsh, 6 B. & C. 551.
But even this reason does not explain
the whole doctrine on this subject, since
the same conclusion does not follow in
misdemeanors. The civil remedy there
is quite independent of any prior prosecution criminally, but the assumed reason
exists for the same rule as in felonies.
Therefore a woman whose life was endangered by the most outrageous assault
could not maintain a civil action for damages until the felon had been prosecuted
criminally, whereas if she had only lost
an arm, she could. Reason would seem
to indicate that private actions should be
more favored in case of the more serious
injury than in the other, but the law is
said to be otherwise. It is to be hoped
that the above-reported case may be carried to the House of Lords, that we may
have a final decision as to the law of England upon this question.
But whatever mav be finally determined to be the law of England on thin
subject, the reasons therefor do not exist in America, and the prevailing doctrine here is, where criminal prosecutions
are instittted and conducted by public
officers appointed for that purpose, that
the civil action may be commenced regardless of a criminal investigation, and
is in no way affected by it. See Boston&4
Worcester Railroad Co. v. Dana, I Gray
83; Pettingill v. Rideout, 6 N. H. 454:

